Did The US Just Take Out North Korea's Missile? LOOK AT THIS!
Published on Apr 15, 2017
http://undergroundworldnews.com
If you apply the info below with recent "Failed" Test in North Korea, you will find some striking similarities!
Even if The US Didn't Do It.. They Can!!!
The New York Times reported last week that the Obama administration initiated, and the Trump administration inherited, a covert action program to “remotely manipulate data inside North Korea’s missile systems.”
The idea here is straightforward. Instead of just relying on antimissile systems, like the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD), which are designed to intercept missiles after they have been launched, you might want tools that would stop the missiles from being launched in the first place. Such “left of launch” tools might include cyber and electronic warfare techniques that sabotage missile components, impair command and control systems, or jam communication signals. They might play a preventive role by, for example, sabotaging North Korean nuclear missile tests.
But “left of launch” approaches may backfire. If a state learns that another state is sabotaging its nuclear program, it might redouble its efforts to implement the program on the basis that the other obviously fears it might succeed. On the other hand, hidden tools that allow one state to subvert another state’s launch systems or otherwise neutralize its second strike capability might increase instability, by weakening the deterrent power of nuclear weapons and increasing uncertainty.
“Left of launch” cyber attacks, like the ones contemplated in the New York Times report, may be particularly risky in tense standoffs. In a new article in the Journal of Cybersecurity we explain why.
It’s hard to know who can do what with cyber weapons.
Learn More:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/amphtm...
If you apply the info below with recent "Failed" Test in North Korea, you will find some striking similarities!
Even if The US Didn't Do It.. They Can!!!
The New York Times reported last week that the Obama administration initiated, and the Trump administration inherited, a covert action program to “remotely manipulate data inside North Korea’s missile systems.”
The idea here is straightforward. Instead of just relying on antimissile systems, like the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD), which are designed to intercept missiles after they have been launched, you might want tools that would stop the missiles from being launched in the first place. Such “left of launch” tools might include cyber and electronic warfare techniques that sabotage missile components, impair command and control systems, or jam communication signals. They might play a preventive role by, for example, sabotaging North Korean nuclear missile tests.
But “left of launch” approaches may backfire. If a state learns that another state is sabotaging its nuclear program, it might redouble its efforts to implement the program on the basis that the other obviously fears it might succeed. On the other hand, hidden tools that allow one state to subvert another state’s launch systems or otherwise neutralize its second strike capability might increase instability, by weakening the deterrent power of nuclear weapons and increasing uncertainty.
“Left of launch” cyber attacks, like the ones contemplated in the New York Times report, may be particularly risky in tense standoffs. In a new article in the Journal of Cybersecurity we explain why.
It’s hard to know who can do what with cyber weapons.
Learn More:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/amphtm...
0 comments:
Post a Comment