One headline in the Asia Times Online proclaimed: “China on the March in Latin America.”1 Another, in Military Review, warned of China’s threat to the United States: “In Uncle Sam’s Backyard: China’s Military Influence in Latin America.”2
Such language underlines fears about China becoming a military rival to
the U.S. —or worse, undermining U.S. security in a region defined in
the past by the Monroe Doctrine. The truth, though, doesn’t look anything like the headlines. Although
military diplomacy and arms sales and transfers to some countries of
the region have increased in the past decade, the quantity and type of
equipment involved hardly represents the strategic threat suggested by
the headline writers. Moreover, much of the equipment is logistical in
nature; little of it is for combat or power projection. There is, to be sure, a heightened Chinese interest in building
alliances and extending contacts with governments and institutional
players (such as militaries) in the region—going beyond just trade and
investment. But the notion that the Chinese are seeking to establish a
strategic beachhead is far-fetched, irresponsible and counterproductive
to establishing a useful relationship with China as its global influence
rises. Contrary to the headlines, China does not want to challenge the
U.S. in the hemisphere. The alarmist reporting, much of it from U.S. sources, also ignores
the Latin American perspective. Latin Americans are not simple
bystanders. They seek to engage China in order to understand the nature
and extent of China’s power and influence—and its effect on their
national interests and foreign policies. They also want to keep their
options open for acquiring military equipment at an affordable price and
technology transfers for coproduction or independent production. They
are also aware of the risks of acquiring a motley mix of systems from
various nations, a prospect that makes maintenance expensive and
readiness problematic. Chinese military activities fall into five categories: humanitarian,
peacekeeping, military exchanges, arms sales and donations, and
technology transfers. 1) Humanitarian Under the banner of “Harmonious Mission 2011,” the Chinese Navy’s
hospital ship, the Peace Ark, entered the Caribbean in October 2011. The
mission was to provide medical services to local people and military
and administrative personnel of countries visited. Stops included Cuba, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Costa Rica.
The craft has 300 hospital beds and eight operating rooms—and carries
416 personnel, 107 of them medical workers. This was the second overseas
voyage of the Peace Ark, following “Harmonious Mission 2010” in the
Gulf of Aden and five countries in Asia and Africa, which treated 15,500
people. The demonstration of soft power is similar to humanitarian missions
conducted by the U.S. Navy’s hospital ship, the USNS Comfort, since
2007. Those trips have taken the USNS Comfort to ports of call in
Central America, South America and the Caribbean to provide care to
thousands. There is one important political distinction: unlike the
Chinese program, the USNS Comfort does not attend to armed forces
personnel and administrative personnel of the countries it visits. 2) Peacekeeping Although it once opposed international peacekeeping, China is now the
largest provider of peacekeepers of the five permanent members of the
UN Security Council, with over 3,100 in Africa and Lebanon. In 2004, China sent 130 riot police to Haiti as part of the UN’s
MINUSTAH peacekeeping forces, becoming the first Chinese uniformed
formation to serve in the Western Hemisphere. Eight Chinese peacekeepers
were killed during the devastating January 2010 earthquake. All but 16
of the 130 were withdrawn in 2010. Taiwan, which has ambassadorial level
relations with Haiti, sent a rescue team of 23 people and two dogs. 3) Military Exchanges Senior defense officials from Latin America visit China routinely and
Chinese officials reciprocate with high-level visits to Latin America.
Students from Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay have gone to
China’s Defense Studies Institute, the Army Command College, the Navy
Command School, and the Naval Research Institute. Though this might seem impressive, the numbers do not come close to
the thousands of Latin American students, military and civilian, who go
to the U.S., Europe and other countries for advanced studies. Moreover,
most of the student programs are one-way: to China. It will be a measure
of increased trust and confidence when Chinese officers are sent to
study in Latin American military schools. The U.S. has sent officers to
study at various Latin American military schools for more than 50 years.
Some of them have reached the highest ranks in the U.S. military. 4) Arms sales The truth is that Latin America is not a large market for arms sales.
Its military establishments are small by world standards and their
defense budgets austere. The defense problems that many countries face
are internal conflicts and public security, not conventional threats
from over the horizon. Latin American defense spending is forecast to grow from $63 billion
in 2011 to $65 billion by 2014, with a mere 20 percent being available
for procurement and the bulk going to personnel costs.3 While
equipment modernization is imperative, only a few countries (Chile,
Brazil, Venezuela) can afford it. And those countries have gone on the
arms market to buy. According to Jane’s Defense Weekly Reports, the amount of arms recently sold or donated by China to Latin American countries is small [see table on p.69]. In the past decade, China sold $58 million worth of Karakorum jets to
Bolivia, upward of $150 million in air surveillance systems to
Venezuela, and donated military materiel to Bolivia, Guyana, Colombia,
and Peru, such as uniforms, trucks, jeeps, field kitchens, engineering
supplies, tents, gloves, and hats. Peru received a mobile field hospital
and other equipment in 2010 worth $300 million. 5) Technology transfer The military technology transfer with Argentina is instructive.
Argentina has produced sophisticated aircraft, including jets, since the
1940s and 1950s. The Fábrica Argentina de Aviones (located in Córdoba) was founded in 1927 and has manufactured over 1,300 aircraft of various types—including the excellent Pucara and Pampa—and
today employs about 1,000 local workers, down from 9,000. Today, the
Argentine government wants to resuscitate that capacity, and there may
be a niche market for light multiple-use transport helicopters in South
America, in addition to sales within Argentina. In October 2011, Argentina announced an agreement with the China
National Aero-Technology Import & Export Corporation to produce the
CZ-W11 ultra-light helicopter. Apparently, a minimum production run of
40 will be necessary to make it economically feasible. The CZ-W11 is a
reverse engineered version (with minor changes) of the Eurocopter AS
35OB Ecureil helicopter. A similar version of the latter, the Ecureil 2,
is being co-produced by Eurocopter subsidiary Helibras in Brazil. Brazil is pushing hard on the technology transfer front to enhance
both its civilian and military industry. Though there is no specific
agreement with China on military technology transfer, the two countries
have developed and launched three Earth resources satellites to benefit
nations that do not have their own satellites to monitor natural
resources, agricultural zones and urban development. Four more are
planned.4 Brazil makes 50 percent of the satellite components. However, another
effort at commercial collaboration foundered. Brazil’s Embraer and
Aviation Industry of China agreed to jointly manufacture the midsize
ERJ-145 passenger jet in Harbin. According to defense analyst R. Evan
Ellis, Embraer viewed the collaboration as necessary to gain access to
the Chinese market, which China resisted. The “relationship,” he added,
“was also soured by the perception within Embraer that the Chinese had
used the partnership to steal Embraer’s technology to support their own
aircraft development.”5 Venezuela paid a Chinese company, Great Wall Industries Corporation
(GWIC), $406 million to develop and launch a satellite, the Simón
Bolívar” in 2008. Similarly, Bolivia contracted with the GWIC to build
the Tupac Katari satellite and launch it in 2013, at a cost of $300
million, of which $295 million would be financed by the China
Development Bank.6 U.S. officials are not publicly concerned about China’s military
activities. Frank Mora, deputy assistant secretary of defense for
Western Hemisphere Affairs, stated in 2009 that while the U.S. stands
for transparency, China’s arms and technology transfers are standard in
the international community, and that some of the equipment can help
Latin American governments improve security and counter drug
trafficking. Henry Kissinger, in his latest book, On China, calls for the
new U.S. relationship with China to be built on strategic trust. The
same advice applies to thinking about the evolving ties between China
and Latin America. ENDNOTES 1. Loro Horta, Asia Times Online, June 29, 2007. Blogger's note:
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author(s) of the article.China’s Military Activity in Latin America
The Five Dimensions
Implications for U.S. Hemispheric Strategy
2. Loro Horta, “In Uncle Sam’s Backyard: China’s Military Influence in Latin America,” Military Review,
September-October 2008, pp. 47-55. For a less alarmist reading, see: R.
Evan Ellis, “China-Latin America Military Engagement: Good Will, Good
Business, and Strategic Position,” Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic
Studies Institute, 2011. A balanced perspective is: Cynthia Watson,
“China’s Arms Sales to Latin America: Another Arrow in the Quiver,”
Jamestown Foundation, February 18, 2010.
3. Rebecca Barrett, “The Military Market of Latin America,” Forecast International, cited in Defense Focus.
4. “Brasil e China farã mais quatro satelites,” Valor Económico, September 2, 2011.
5. Ellis, p. 32.
6. Ellis, p. 35.
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